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Introduction: Memory and Tradition
In a volume of collected articles published in 2000 Jan Assmann discussed the social construction of memory, pointing out that how we remember our own past is inextricably bound to acts of forgetting: 'to remember something', he writes, 'means letting other things recede into the background, drawing distinctions, canceling out many things in order to highlight others'.
1 This observation can be easily applied to the concept of "tradition": certain things are handed down from one generation to the next because it is believed they must be remembered, but in order for this to be possible, principles of selection, demarcation and suppression are necessary. No tradition can exist or stay alive without demarcating its own identity from something that is seen as representing its negative counterpart, its "other"; and as a result, this "other" necessarily accompanies any tradition, as the shadowy background or dark canvas which allows it to draw the contours of its own identity in the first place. The presence of this shadow can therefore never be forgotten; but in order to fulfull its role as a negative background, neither can it be brought into the full daylight of memory and recollection. In short, it must be selectively remembered and selectively forgotten.
In this article I hope to demonstrate this at the example of 18th-century Enlightenment historiography. The very tradition of critical historical research that has been handed down to us as scholars and academics since that period, and of which we are all the heirs, shaped and defined its own identity decisively during the later 17th and the 18th century; and this happened by means of a complicated and often painful process of deciding what, exactly, had to be rejected, and on what basis such a rejection could be rationally legitimated and explained. The final outcome, I will argue, was that Enlightenment historiography created the popular image of a "counter-tradition" which was seen as encompassing and representing everything the Enlightenment and its heirs rejected as wrong; and the cluster of historical currents, ideas, personalities and ways of thinking that were associated with this counter-tradition turns out to consist precisely of what is nowadays studied under the more recently-invented umbrella-term of "Western esotericism". The match is so exact that there can be no doubt, in my opinion, that this is how our field was construed as a category of scholarly research.
2
In order to define its very identity, the Enlightenment needed to construe the memory of pagan, occult, superstitious and irrational religion and thought as an essentially unified tradition of unreason from which the light of rationality and science had now finally managed to liberate itself. But at the same time, this tradition had to be sharply excluded from the true history of thought: henceforth the history of philosophy should focus on the progress of reason, not on the tenacious persistance and endless resurgence of unfounded beliefs. As a result of this process of exclusion (which can really be described metaphorically as one of expurgation, purification, even exorcism), enormous bodies of traditional thought that-as will be seen-were still discussed seriously and at great length by the early pioneers of the history of philosophy during the 17th century, were increasingly marginalized by the historiography of the 19th and eventually the 20th century. The final result was a dramatic loss of historical memory, which we are now only beginning to correct.
